Donor conditionality in Sri Lanka
So I was replying to drac’s comment on my last post when being the clumsy monkey that I am, I managed to delete a good 3 paras by one stray backspace press. So I thought i’ll make a post of it, now that I woke up before the alarm on avurudu morning. Drac and I were discussing the pitfalls of donor conditionality and whether it isn’t such a bad idea to “go it alone”, as was brought up in the previous post. Drac argued that donor conditions were not always politically feasible to implement (very true) and sometimes undesirable. This is the relevant part of drac’s comment;
“Do you really think that a government is in a position to say no to terms and conditions put forward by banks? I’m pretty sure it’s not as simple as saying no. Benin is one example, Indonesia is another. A frequently recurring theme with both ADB and WB development aid and loans is the requirement for liberalization of markets. Some industries in SL are less ready to take this step than others
The problem with blaming donor conditions and making unpopular decisions is that the opposition usually takes the chance to promise an overturn and a return to the status quo. As superficial as it sounds, people do buy that line and vote accordingly. It happens to the UNP more than most Speaking of specifics, the organizations have long been on the government’s case to reduce subsidies and welfare spending… I’m sure I’m uninformed but I remember that being a long running string attached to further aid.”
A couple of interesting points come up here. The first is that loan conditionality has evolved over the last decade or so. In the 80’s and 90’s the World Bank and the IMF notoriously imposed loan conditionalities that have been at loggerheads with the interests of developing countries. I think their main fault was to assume that market imperfections in developing countries are much the same as those which affect developed countries. But there seems to have been a shift, which culminated in the Paris Declaration a couple of years ago. From the Sri Lankan experience, there certainly has been a change since the turn of the century.
In 2001, following the worst year for the economy in my memory, SL took a structural adjustment loan from the IMF. Part of the conditionality of this loan was to temper the tampering with the exchange rate. We had a balance of payments crisis bc we created excess domestic demand without letting the exchange rate adjust, resulting in a crashing BoP. (I’m going to have some fun here so ignore this if you have a decent understanding of macroeconomics; excess govt. spending results in increased demand without a parallel increase in supply to meet this demand, so ppl spend more than what the country produces, therefore requiring imports. With increased imports there will be downward pressure on the balance of payments. Now if the exchange rate is allowed to float, it will depreciate in reflection of the increased imports, making imports more expensive. This would reduce demand for imports and the BoP would be OK. But if the exchange rate is articifically held high by govt buying Rs, imports will remain relatively cheap and demand for imports will not fall, putting more and more pressure on the BoP until crisis hits.) So I think that type of conditionality is a sensible thing. It would be like spending loads of money on treating cancer with panadol if not. (It was amusing hearing chief justice Sarath Silva referring to the latest CBSL growth figures as unbelievable (literally) and that the economy is like a cancer which also grows but that growth is not necessarily a good thing in this context. Please sir, stick to your day job).
The type of macro conditionality that I think drac was referring to was more a thing of the 80s and 90s. The latest episode of SLkan borrowing which was associated with market oriented reforms was in the ‘02-’04 PRSP (also known as Regaining Sri Lanka) process under the then UNP govt. The RSL received budgetary support funding from the Bank and the Fund in the form of PRSC and PRGF. The RSL was not imposed by the donors. It was highly market oriented and economically right wing, but this was a reflection, I think, of the political economy ideology of the UNP. Now it could be argued that the UNP tailored the RSL so that it would receive funding from the donors, and that’s why it was so market oriented, but then you can’t really say it was imposed. It wasn’t like in 2001 when we took a loan out of desperation, this was more a choice. If the govt did not want to be under such conditions it just didn’t need to go for a PRSP.
The present govt for instance is not going for a PRSP process. The loans they have been taking are what are called project based loans, where a donor will support a particular project, rather than supporting the budget in general. In these kinds of loans there is no macro-conditionality involved. You can ask the ERD, you can even ask the JVP and they will have to admit this amidst a violent volley of rhetoric. Conditionality in this case is a matter of project specific conditionality. For instance an energy sector project will have CEB reforms attached to it. The ADB funding for an energy project fell through bc CEB reforms did not take place, one of the best things that has happened to our country imo. I would argue that a clever govt will use donor conditions to tie their hands into tough but needed reforms, but drac is right to suggest that this would be political suicide in Sri Lanka’s recent history of coalition governments. If a donor tells the govt that it won’t fund a project unless agricultural subsidies are removed or land reform takes place, the govt can just give them the finger and go get money from the ADB (which traditionally does not impose macro conditionality), Japan, China or Iran (yay). More importantly, the donors’ agenda is to keep lending, and given the increase access to external finance in SL (emergence of China, India as lenders), the multilateral donors have less power in the negotiating bargain. This situation changes when desperation sets in, like in 2001. In such an instance the government must get cash at low rates from a specialised institute like the IMF. In such a case there is far more power in the hands of the donors. So I do think there’s a hell of a lot of choice involved here, and evil donor imposed conditions are hardly a valid argument any more.
As mentioned earlier, the Paris Declaration addresses most of the concerns of recipient countries in terms of donor powers. But the problem is that Sri Lanka as a negotiating government makes little or no use of the PD in aid negotiations. Given the fact that donors want to lend, and there is a document around called the Paris Declaration and there are alternate sources of capital, there really should be a massive amount of recipient voice in aid arrangements. The fact that we don’t always get the bargain we want is more our fault than anyone else’s.

